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This paper examines fiscal policy issues in the Republic of Korea (hereafter Korea) after the 
2009 global financial crisis, including the timing of fiscal policy responses, the effectiveness 
of expansionary measures, and the long-term implications for government debt. In order to 
evaluate more accurately Korea’s fiscal response since late 2008, this paper conducts an 
empirical analysis using historical data from Korea and other countries and derives stylized 
patterns on counter-cyclicality of fiscal policy and its role in the recovery process.  The 
analysis suggests that Korea’s fiscal stimulus in 2009, while having contributed greatly to the 
economy’s fast recovery, was unusually large compared with typical fiscal responses during 
economic downturns. This paper also investigates  whether the rapid increase in Korea’s 
fiscal debt burden is admissible  in terms of long-term sustainability.  Although existing 
evidence suggests that Korea’s fiscal debt is still manageable, the sizeable deficit and the 
increasing trend in the debt  to  GDP ratio in recent years call for vigilance.  The paper 
concludes with some suggestions for fiscal consolidation  in Korea: a stricter practice of 
medium-term budget planning,  expansion of automatic stabilizers and reduction of 
discretionary components, use of more comprehensive measures of government debt, and 
further reforms in the national pension system are discussed. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines fiscal policy issues in the Republic of Korea (hereafter Korea) after the 
2009 global financial crisis, including the timing of fiscal policy responses, the effectiveness 
of expansionary measures, and the long-term implications for government debt. 
As in most other countries, fiscal policy turned expansionary in Korea after the onset of the 
current crisis. While government expenditure increased by 15% in 2009, revenues increased 
by  only 2%  in nominal terms. As a consequence, the  consolidated budget balance and 
operational budget balance of the central government a share of gross domestic product 
(GDP), were -2.1% and -5%, respectively, in 2009, and they are expected to be -0.4% and -
2.9%, respectively, in 2010. It is widely recognized that the sizeable fiscal stimulus has 
contributed to Korea’s rapid recovery. For example, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
estimates that the fiscal stimulus added 0.9-2.8 percentage point to baseline GDP growth in 
the first half of 2009. In this paper, I attempt to summarize fiscal policy developments in 
Korea since last year and assess how effective fiscal policy has been in curbing the impact 
of the global crisis. In particular, I conduct an empirical analysis using historical data from the 
Republic of Korea and other countries and derive stylized patterns on counter-cyclicality of 
fiscal policy and its role in the recovery process. Using these patterns, I am able to evaluate 
more accurately Korea’s fiscal response since late 2008. My analysis suggests that Korea’s 
fiscal stimulus, while having contributed greatly to the economy’s fast recovery, was 
unusually large compared with fiscal responses during other periods of recession. 
To help us assess the possible long term implications of expansionary fiscal policy, I provide 
a review of existing studies on the sustainability of fiscal debt in Korea. Prior to the 1997–
1998 Asian crisis, fiscal policy was not actively used as a stabilization tool in Korea, and thus 
fiscal deficits or government debt were not issues of primary concern. After the 1997–1998 
Asian crisis, however, the trend changed and government debt started to increase rapidly. 
The current expansionary fiscal policy by the government will further accelerate this rising 
trend in government debt. I investigate whether the rapid increase in Korea’s fiscal debt 
burden is admissible using conventional theoretical frameworks.  
Moreover, I will attempt to assess what policy frameworks are needed to secure long-term 
fiscal sustainability in Korea. I suggest that implementation of more fiscal rules, such as 
automatic stabilizers and reforms in the national pension system, can be important. 
  
2.  RECENT TRENDS IN KOREA’S FISCAL BALANCE 
Korea’s government budget has been largely in balance, except for the periods of the 1997–
1998 Asian crisis and the 2008–2009 global crisis. In its management of the government 
budget, the Korean government put fiscal discipline above all else and followed the principle 
of “spending within budget.” Other objectives of fiscal policy were subordinated to the fiscal 
balance management. 
The fiscal stance was even briefly tightened immediately after the breakout of the Asian 
crisis in late 1997, in accordance with IMF guidelines, in order to improve current account 
balance and to stop further depreciation of the  Korean  won. In 1998, however, as the 
negative impact of the crisis turned out to be much more severe than had been expected, 
the Korean government and the IMF agreed to switch to an expansionary fiscal policy. A 
large  proportion of fiscal expenditure during this period was used to  bail out financial 
institutions in trouble. It is widely believed that the expansionary fiscal policy adopted during 
this period was particularly effective as it provided a stimulus to the economy through money 
and credit creation in addition to the traditional Keynesian multiplier effect (Lee, Rhee, and ADBI Working Paper 225    Hong 
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Sung 2006). The sharp increase in the government budget deficit in 1998 and 1999 marked 
a structural break from the long time tradition of balanced budgets in Korea. This departure 
was made possible because the tradition of balanced budgets had kept government debt at 
low levels.  
Figures 1 and 2  show the time series of Korea’s government budget  balance and 
government debt as percentages of gross domestic product (GDP). In Figure 1 presents 
both  the  consolidated budget balance and the operational budget balance of the central 
government. The operational budget balance, defined as the consolidated budget balance 
minus the social security balance plus redemption of public funds, is used for more rigorous 
evaluations  of fiscal soundness.
1
Figure 1: The Fiscal Balance to GDP Ratio in Korea
* 
 As the figure shows, government  budgets  have  been 
largely balanced in Korea, with the consolidated budget balance  to  GDP ratio and the 
operational budget to GDP ratio recording 0.2% and -1.15% on average, respectively. 1998 
and 1999 were exceptional years in terms of the magnitude of the government budget 
deficit: the consolidated budget balance as percentages of GDP was -4% in 1998 and -2.5% 




Source: Ministry of Strategy and Finance 
                                                 
1 In Korea, the social security balance has been in surplus because the national pension system, which requires 
a minimum contribution period of twenty years for eligibility, has been accumulating surpluses since it was first 
introduced in 1988. The balance will, however, deteriorate quickly in the coming years as participants in the 
national pension system start to retire and become recipients of pension benefits. In fact, at the current 
contribution rate and the replacement rate, the pension system is expected to go bankrupt within a  few 




Figure 2: The Fiscal Debt to GDP Ratio in Korea 
 
Source: Ministry of Strategy and Finance 
 However, the fiscal balance to GDP ratio in Figure 1 may be misleading because, as Figure 
2 shows, the fiscal debt to GDP ratio has been increasing quite rapidly since 1998. Fiscal 
debt of the general government jumped from 10% of GDP in 1996 to 34% of GDP in 1999 
and has remained high ever since. For the central government, the increase in government 
debt was more gradual but equally large. By 2008, the central government debt to GDP ratio 
had increased to 29%, not much lower than the general government debt to GDP ratio. The 
discrepancy between Figures 1 and 2 arises because some components of government debt 
are not taken into account when calculating the government budget balance. For example, 
the Foreign Exchange Stabilization Bond issues by the central government to raise funds for 
stabilization of the foreign exchange market and the National Housing Bond used for public 
provision of housing services are taken into account when calculating government debt, but 
not in calculating the government budget deficit. Moreover, public funds that were raised 
during the Asian financial crisis through the issuance of bonds by the  Korea Deposit 
Insurance Corporation and the Korea Asset Management Corporation were gradually turned 
into government debt starting in 2003. The rapid increase in central government debt in 
recent years has been caused by the expansion of these items. 
People have different views on the nature of these liabilities. Some argue that they can be 
offset by corresponding assets and thus the rapid increase in total fiscal debt may not be a 
serious problem. Others argue that poor management of the funds has incurred losses and 
therefore can pose a threat to long term fiscal stability. However, regardless of the nature of 
these particular liabilities, the true fiscal burden of the Korean government is likely to be 
substantially greater than Figures 1 or 2 may suggest. It is widely known that numerous 
quasi-fiscal accounts of public funds and public enterprises in Korea are not included in the 
IMF definition of fiscal debt (for example, Lee, Rhee, and Sung 2006). When these hidden 
liabilities are added, the fiscal debt figure increases substantially. For example, Ok (2007) 
argues that, with the liabilities of quasi-governmental bodies included, Korea’s fiscal debt at 
the end of 2007 amounted to about 76% of GDP, almost twice the official figure.
2
                                                 
2  Of course, other countries may  have similar problems: under a more comprehensive definition of the 
government, the fiscal debt to GDP ratio may substantially increase in other countries as well. However, many 
people including OK (2007) seem to believe that the size of quasi-fiscal accounts omitted from the official data 
is particularly large in Korea. 
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In 2009, the Korean government ran another major deficit to contain the negative effects of 
the global financial crisis. Government expenditure increased sharply while tax revenues 
remained almost unchanged compared to 2008. Preliminary estimates indicate that Korea’s 
consolidated central government budget balance as a % of GDP was -2.1% in 2009 and is 
expected to be -0.4% in 2010. The operational budget balance to GDP ratio was -5% in 
2009 and is expected to be -2.9% in 2010. Due to the sizeable deficit, the fiscal debt to GDP 
ratio must have further increased in 2009. The Korean government estimates that the 
general government debt to GDP ratio increased from 32.8% in 2008 to 35.6% in 2009.  
Most of Korea’s fiscal stimulus was concentrated in the areas of social development and 
economic development. As Figure 3 shows, the share of expenditure on social development 
and economic development increased in 2009, while the share of education and national 
defense decreased at the same time. Social development includes public health, social 
welfare, housing, regional development, entertainment, etc., and economic development 
includes energy, industries, transport, communication, etc. These two areas take up almost 
50% of total expenditure and also are to a greater extent subject to cyclical fluctuations than 
other areas. As can be expected, the share of these two areas exhibited a similar increase in 
1998. The sharp increase in fiscal expenditure and the heavy focus on large-scale 
infrastructure investment have raised concerns about possible distortions in resource 
allocations. In particular, critics argue that the current Lee administration has a strong 
inclination towards fiscal expansion which may lead to waste of resources. For example, the 
Four Rivers Restoration Project, a multi-billion dollar project with the stated goals of 
preventing water shortages and promoting tourism, is being criticized by many as 
economically inefficient and environmentally harmful. The project may help boost the 
country’s construction sector, but only at the expense of taxpayers. 
Figure 3: The Composition of Fiscal Expenditures in Korea 
 
Source:  Ministry of Strategy and Finance 
To summarize, favorable initial conditions of Korea in terms of fiscal debt and contingent 
liabilities enabled the government to adopt a large fiscal stimulus package in 2009 in 
response to the global crisis. However, this expansionary policy is likely to accelerate the 
already rapid expansion of Korea’s fiscal debt.
3
                                                 
3 Korea is not the only country that will witness a sharp increase in the fiscal debt/GDP ratio. In fact, according to 
IMF (2009b), most OECD economies are expected to see a similar jump in 2009 and 2010.  
 The rapid increase in the fiscal debt to GDP 
ratio can be a serious threat particularly because a more comprehensive measure of ADBI Working Paper 225    Hong 
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government liabilities that takes into account numerous quasi-fiscal activities in Korea would 
likely be substantially greater than the official figures indicate. 
In the next section, I examine how Korea’s fiscal policy in 2009 fares against typical policy 
reactions during economic downturns. To do so, I use historical cross-country data from a 
comprehensive set of countries including Korea. Through this empirical analysis, I intend to 
determine how counter-cyclical Korea’s fiscal response was in 2009 compared with other 
periods  of economic downturn  in  Korea and other economies. We  have seen that most 
countries, including Korea, recorded substantial deficits in 2009. Strictly speaking, however, 
a fiscal deficit does not necessarily mean a discretionary expansion. Even without any active 
discretionary policy changes, the government budget balance would typically turn into deficit 
during economic downturns because of the existence of automatic stabilizers such as 
income tax and transfer payments. In other words, the government may record a 
government budget deficit during a recession simply because the economy is in such a bad 
shape.  To make a proper policy evaluation, one needs to distinguish between cyclical 
components and discretionary components in fiscal variables and examine how the 
discretionary components changed during a particular economic downturn. The next section 
provides such analysis. 
3.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF POLICY RESPONSES AND 
RECOVERY 
Most of this section’s analysis is borrowed from Hong, Lee, and Tang (2010b).  
3.1  Data 
In  my  analysis,  I  investigate  21  developing Asian economies and 21  industrialized 
economies. While most previous studies on recessions and recoveries consider only 
developed economies (Claessens et al. 2008;  IMF 2009a), this paper examines Asian 
developing economies as well to provide a more useful comparison with the Korean 
economy. The developing Asian economies in my sample include: the 10 Association of 
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN);
4
In dating recession periods, I  use annual, not quarterly, real GDP figures  from World 
Development Indicators and OECD. Quarterly GDP series for developing economies are 
very limited and not seasonally adjusted in most cases. For analyzing policy responses, we 
use changes in government consumption expenditure as a  measure fiscal policy and 
changes in the call interest rate as a measure of monetary policy. Fiscal policy response is 
my main interest and monetary policy is considered mainly for controlling purposes. I use 
government consumption expenditure instead of a more standard measure such as primary 
balance because the latter has very low data availability, especially among developing Asian 
economies.
 Bangladesh; People’s Republic of China (PRC); Hong 
Kong, China; India; Kazakhstan; Korea; Kyrgyz Republic; Pakistan; Papua New Guinea; Sri 
Lanka; and Uzbekistan. The industrialized economies refer to 21 Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, namely  Australia; Austria; Belgium; 
Canada; Denmark; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Ireland; Italy; Japan; Netherlands; 
New Zealand; Norway; Portugal; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; United Kingdom; and US. The 
sample period is from 1961 to 2008. The  data set is unbalanced due to missing 
observations.  
5
                                                 
4 ASEAN includes Brunei Darussalam,  Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), 
Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam. 
 Both the call rate and government consumption are obtained from the 
5 Also, they changed the accounting framework for government finance from cash basis to accrual basis around 
2004. The switch from cash-basis accounting to accrual-basis accounting was recommended by the ADBI Working Paper 225    Hong 
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International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics and OECD. The call rate is 
adjusted for inflation, where inflation is defined as annual growth in consumer price inflation.  
3.2  Definitions of Recession and Recovery 
I first date peaks and troughs in GDP series based on the concept of “classical” business 
cycles which was formalized by Burns and Mitchell (1946)  and later implemented in 
algorithm by Bry and Boschan (1971) and Harding and Pagan (2002).  While relatively 
simple, this dating practice is known to closely match the business-cycle dates provided by 
the National Bureau of Economic Research (in the case of the United States) or other more 
complicated approaches. When applied to an annual series, Harding and Pagan’s rule 
implies that period t should be defined as a trough if xt < xt+k, for k = -1 and 1, and a peak if xt 
> xt+k, for k = -1 and 1. In other words, any year of negative growth can be regarded as a 
recession or a downturn. Watson (1994) uses the same reasoning in his analysis of annual 
data. I apply this rule to my annual real GDP series.
6
It is less straightforward to define a recovery, because people seem to use the word 
“recovery” to imply many different things. In this paper, I use the following two definitions: (1) 
the time length until recovery to previous peak, and (2) the growth rate during the first year of 
recovery. The first definition measures how long GDP, after hitting a trough, remains below 
the previous peak. The second definition measures the GDP growth rate during the one year 
period that immediately follows a trough. These are the same definitions as those used in 
World Economic Outlook by IMF (2009a). Figure 4 illustrates an example. In the example, 
the series reaches a peak in period t  and a trough in  period  t+2.  The duration of the 
downturn is thus 2 and the amplitude ab. After hitting a trough in period t+2, the series 
recovers the value of b in period t+3. Thus, the time until recovery to previous peak is 1 (or 
t+3 minus t+2), and the growth during the first year after the trough is also ab. 
 Once peaks and troughs are dated, a 
recession is naturally defined as the period that lies between a peak and the following 
trough. The duration is simply given by the length (number of years) of a recession, and the 
amplitude by the peak-to-trough fall in the logarithmic value of the series. According to these 
definitions, the sample probability of recession is 8.4% for OECD and 9.9% for developing 
Asia. Also, the average duration of a recession is 1.3 years for OECD and 1.5 years for Asia, 
while the average amplitude is -1.7%  for OECD and -6.3%  for Asia. For the Korean 
economy, the recession probability is only 4%: Korea has experienced only two recession 
episodes during the whole sample period and each one lasted for one year. The amplitude 
of Korea’s recession was -4% on average.  
                                                                                                                                                  
Government Finance Manual 2001 of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The newly constructed 
government finance data are available only for 1990 and afterward, while the old series are available only up to 
2001. The two series are not consistent with each other and thus cannot be combined. 
6 It is clear that we do not need a separate censoring rule for annual series, because a complete cycle (from 
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Source: author’s illustration 
3.3  Definitions of Policy Responses 
A difficulty in measuring policy responses is to distinguish between discretionary changes in 
policies and the component of policies that automatically responds to economic fluctuations. 
Government spending, for example, is largely constrained by government revenue which in 
turn is determined by economic activity. Consequently, government spending tends to 
decrease during recessions even when the government switches to an expansionary stance 
by running deficits. In order to properly evaluate discretionary policy responses by the 
government, one needs to control for the automatic positive correlation between government 
consumption and GDP that may originate from income elasticity of tax revenue. In this 
paper, I address this problem by making cyclical adjustments for policy variables using a 
simple regression framework. More specifically, to cyclically adjust government 
consumption,  I  estimate the following equation separately for each of the developed-
economy group and the developing-economy group: 
government consumption gapi,t = β0 + β1*GDP gapi,t + ei,t,               (1) 
where government consumption gap and GDP gap are residuals from Hodrick-Prescott 
filtering of logarithm of government consumption expenditure and logarithm of GDP, 
respectively.
7 Cyclically adjusted government consumption is given by the residual in 
equation (1).
8
For the call interest rate, the following equation is estimated for each of the developed-
economy group and the developing-economy group: 
 It can be regarded as a measure or proxy of discretionary fiscal policy, with a 
positive value indicating an expansionary stance. 
real interest ratei,t = γ0 + γ1*GDP gapi,t + γ2*inflationi,t + γ3*dummy_85i,t + εi,t,     (2) 
where dummy_85 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for periods after 1985. It is 
included to allow for a possible structural shift in the equilibrium interest rate. A cyclically 
adjusted interest rate is given by the residual in equation (2). Since equation (2) corresponds 
                                                 
7 A smoothing parameter of 6.25 is used for an annual series and a parameter of 1600 is used for a quarterly 
series.. 
8 To reduce endogeneity bias, we use instrumental variables estimation for the government consumption 
equation, with one year lagged value of GDP gap used as the instrument.  
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to the Taylor rule for monetary policy, a positive deviation from the rule can be regarded as a 
discretionary tightening of monetary policy. 
Now, using cyclically adjusted policy variables obtained from equations (1) and (2), I can 
measure the policy response over the course of a recession. Specifically, I define the policy 
response as the cumulative sum of changes in the cyclically adjusted policy variable during a 
recession period (from a peak to the next trough).  
3.4  Stylized Facts 
I first cite some summary statistics about recovery from Hong, Lee, and Tang (2010b). As 
Table 1 shows, the average time until recovery to the previous peak is 1.89 years for 
developing Asian economies while only 1.44 years for OECD economies. The slower 
recovery in Asia can also be seen from Figure 5, which illustrates the probability that an 
economy will remain below the previous peak beyond a certain number of years. The 
probability to “survive” (to remain below the previous peak) is estimated using a Weibull 
distribution. It is clear from Figure 5 that the survival function takes consistently higher 
values for developing Asia. For example, the probability to “survive” (to remain unrecovered) 
two years after the trough is about 50% for developing Asia and about 40% for OECD. Using 
the same sample of countries, Hong, Lee, and Tang (2009a) reported that both the duration 
and the absolute magnitude of the peak-to-trough amplitude are greater for developing Asia. 
Table 1 and Figure 5 indicate a recession is not only longer-lasting and more severe but also 
harder to overcome in developing Asia. The median length of time to recovery, however, is 
equally 1 year for both regions, suggesting that developing Asia has witnessed a few 
exceptionally slow recoveries in the past.  
Table 1: Recovery from a Recession 
  Mean  Median  Standard deviation 
OECD       
Time until recovery  
to previous peak
1  
1.44  1.00  1.00 
Growth during the 
first year of recovery
2  
2.92  2.51  1.99 
All-time average growth  3.33  3.24  2.53 
Developing Asia       




*  1.00  1.73
* 
Growth during the  
first year of recovery
2 
5.25  4.00  3.64 
All-time average growth  5.49  5.80  4.87 
 
Source: Hong, Lee, and Tang (2010b) 
Note: All-time average growth refers to the average growth rate over the entire sample period. 
     * The 1979-1981 recession of Brunei Darussalam is excluded. The recovery to previous peak took 21 years in this 
particular case. 
1Number of years. 




Figure 5: Probability to Remain Unrecovered 
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Source: Hong, Lee, and Tang (2010b) 
My second measure of recovery, the GDP growth rate during the first year of recovery, is 
5.25% for developing Asia and 2.92% for the OECD countries. As mentioned above, Hong, 
Lee, and Tang (2009a) report that the peak-to-trough drop is also sharper in developing 
Asia. Taken together, these results imply that the developing Asian economies experience a 
steep downturn but recover quickly.. This may seem to contradict the aforementioned 
patterns in the time until recovery and the survival function. I note, however, that the two 
regions have very different potential growth rates as shown in Table 1, the all-time average 
of GDP growth is 3.33% for the OECD and 5.49% for developing Asia.
9
Next I present some findings about policy responses from Hong, Lee, and Tang (2010b). As 
explained above, I define policy responses as the cumulative sum of changes in cyclically 
adjusted government consumption or cyclically adjusted call interest rates. Thus, a positive 
value  for  fiscal policy corresponds to an expansionary stance while a positive value for 
monetary policy corresponds to a contractionary stance. Table 2 shows how fiscal and 
monetary policies have responded to recessions in OECD and developing Asia.
 When this fixed 
difference in the potential growth rate is accounted for, my second recovery measure does 
not show much difference between the two regions. For Korea, the first measure of recovery 
is one year and the second measure of recovery is 7.5%. 
10
                                                 
9 The average growth rate during the first year of recovery is not much influenced by the 1979-1981 recession of 
Brunei Darussalam. 
 I find that 
discretionary changes in government consumption have been significantly positive during 
recessions in both the OECD and developing Asia, with growth rates of 2.2% and 3.9%, 
respectively. Clearly, this does not necessarily mean that actual government consumption 
increases during a recession. With no cyclical adjustment, government consumption may 
well exhibit negative growth during a recession as fiscal revenues  decrease. Indeed, 
cumulative government consumption growth during a recession turns out to be -0.5% for 
developing Asia and 2.7% for the OECD in my sample. Fiscal policy measures in Table 2 
only indicate that government consumption during a recession tends to decrease less than is 
implied by the simple income elasticity. Also note that the difference in the fiscal policy 
measure between OECD and developing Asia does not necessarily imply that Asian 
governments have been more counter-cyclical on the whole. The fiscal policy measure may 
be larger in Asia because automatic stabilizers in the region are relatively small and thus 
need to be supplemented by discrete government spending. 
10 I identify and exclude outlier observations before computing the policy measures reported in Table 2. Outliers 
in each variable are identified using the method developed by Hadi (1994). Stata provides the routine for this 
procedure. ADBI Working Paper 225    Hong 
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Table 2: Policy Responses 
  Mean  Median  Standard deviation 








**  2.48 




**  4.84 
Monetary policy
2  -0.65  -0.79  3.56 
 
Source: Hong, Lee, and Tang (2010b) 
Note: * and ** denote significance at the 10% level and the 5% level, respectively. Monetary policy is based on the 
cyclical adjustment of the interest rate that uses GDP gap, inflation, and dummy_85 as controlling variables.  
1% changes from peak to trough. 
2 Percentage point changes from peak to trough. 
 
In contrast to fiscal policy, the monetary policy response is significantly different from zero 
only in OECD economies. According to table 2, the cumulative decrease in the cyclically-
adjusted call rate during a recession is about 0.58 percentage points for OECD. And it is 
significantly positive at the ten % level.
11
Korea’s policy responses during the two recession episodes in 1980 and 1998 have been 
greater than the international average: the fiscal policy response was 11.2%  and the 
monetary policy response was -1.55 percentage points.  
 For developing Asian economies, the cumulative 
change in the call rate is not significant even if negative, suggesting that monetary 
authorities in Asia may not have been as active in changing the interest rate to moderate the 
effects of a recession. 
3.5  Policy Responses and Recovery 
In this section, I examine whether the counter-cyclical policy responses play an important 
role in the recovery process. To achieve that goal, I first estimate the following equation that 
relates GDP growth during the first post-trough year to policy responses and control 
variables: 
GDP growth during the first year of recoveryi,t = δ0 + δ1*fiscal policyi,t                 (3) 
+ δ2*monetary policyi,t + δ’Xi,t + η i,t 
The unit of observation in equation (3) is each recession episode and thus the subscript i,t 
denotes recession t in country i. The policy measures used here are the same with those in 
Table 2 and the vector of control variables X includes the peak-to-trough amplitude of a 
recession and policy variables of Japan. The peak-to-trough amplitude is included to control 
for possible interrelation between the severity of a downturn and the pace of subsequent 
recovery. To the extent that there is overshooting in the initial drop, a greater fall will tend to 
be followed by a sharper recovery in the following periods. Also, since Japan is a leading 
economy in Asia, the macroeconomic policy stance of Japan may have important 
implications for the recovery of other economies in the region. Japan’s policy stance is 
measured by the changes in cyclically adjusted interest rate and government consumption 
                                                 
11 Although not reported in the table, we have used quarterly data for OECD economies and found that both 
fiscal and monetary policies turn expansionary during a recession in OECD. 
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expenditures in the year immediately preceding a trough. Equation (3) is estimated using a 
panel model with fixed effects in order to control for cross-country differences in the potential 
growth rate and other country-specific effects. 
In addition to equation (3), I estimate the following equation that specifies the probability 
density of recovery as a Weibull function: 




γ)                (4) 
In my definition, a recovery is achieved when GDP, after hitting a trough, recovers to the 
previous peak value. Thus, the event time ti denotes the time when GDP recovers to its 
previous peak in the recession episode i. zi and β are the covariate vector of recession i and 
the corresponding coefficient vector, respectively, and γ  is the shape parameter of the 
distribution. The covariate vector z includes the same explanatory variables as in equation 
(3), i.e., the peak-to-trough amplitude of a recession and policy variables of Japan. Again, 
the unit of observation is each recession episode rather than a country-year.  
I first estimate equation (3) using GDP recessions from OECD and developing Asia and 
provide the results in columns (1) and (2) of Table 3. I consider the two regions at the same 
time in order to maximize the number of observations. When considered separately, Asia 
has only 19 recession episodes that have no missing values in the policy and control 
variables. However, since the main goal of the analysis is to derive implications for Korea, I 
also estimate equation (3) using only the Asian sample and report the results in column (3). 
Fortunately, despite the small number of observations, estimation results from the Asian 
sample are not much different.  
Column (1) shows that, for the whole sample, fiscal policy has a significantly positive effect 
on the pace of recovery. The estimated coefficient (about 0.3) implies that a one standard 
deviation increase in the fiscal policy measure (about 3.4 percentage points) leads to a 1 
percentage point increase in the GDP growth rate. The IMF  (2009a)  has shown, using 
quarterly data for the OECD economies, that the fiscal policy response is important for the 
strength of recovery. Applying the same approach to annual data from OECD and 
developing Asian economies, I confirm the IMF’s finding that counter-cyclical fiscal policy 
helps promote recovery. In contrast to fiscal policy, monetary policy does not seem to have a 
systematic effect on the post-trough growth: the coefficient on the monetary policy measure 
is close to zero and insignificant. The  coefficient on the absolute value of amplitude is 
significantly positive, indicating that the economy tends to recover more rapidly following a 
greater initial fall.
12
                                                 
12 IMF (2009a) reports the opposite: they use the peak-to-trough amplitude without any transformation and still 
obtain a positive coefficient. It is not clear where the discrepancy between IMF (2009a) and our result stems 
from. We have examined quarterly data for OECD countries following IMF (2009a) and still found that a greater 
fall is associated with a faster recovery. 




Table 3: GDP Growth during the first year of recovery 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
























Fiscal policy of 




Monetary policy of 






# of obs.  73  73  19 
 
Source: author’s calculations. 
Note: The dependent variable is the GDP growth rate during the first year after a trough. Panel estimation with fixed 
effects. t-ratios are in parentheses. * and ** denote significance at the 10% level and the 5% level, respectively.
  
In column (2), I add Japan’s policy variables and find that the monetary policy of Japan has a 
significant effect on other countries’ recovery. The coefficient indicates that a 1 percentage 
point decrease in cyclically adjusted interest rate in Japan is associated with a 0.4 
percentage point increase in the post-trough GDP growth rate in other countries. Although 
not reported in the table, when examining fiscal and monetary policies of the United States 
and Germany, I find that none of the foreign policy variables has a significant effect. This is 
not entirely surprising, because my sample is heavily representative of Asian economies that 
have strongest economic ties with Japan. However, one may still wonder exactly how a 
lower interest rate in Japan promotes recovery in other countries when it has not been 
particularly successful in providing a boost to the domestic economy. One possible 
explanation is that an increase in the supply of Japanese Yen may be associated with 
increased international capital outflows. For example, a lower interest rate in Japan 
encourages other countries to increase their borrowings from Japan. The increased 
borrowings in turn will result in an easing of financial conditions in those countries, thereby 
stimulating economic activity. Hong and Lee (2009) provide an example to  support  this 
argument. By applying the business cycle dating methodology of Harding and Pagan (2002) 
to Japan’s domestic credit, they report that Japan appears to have experienced a major 
credit contraction between the fourth quarter of 1996 and the first quarter of 1998, just before 
the onset of the 1997–1998 Asian crisis. This suggests that tight credit conditions in Japan 
may have been a partial cause of the Asian crisis. 
In column (3), I examine how the estimation results change when only Asian recessions are 
used in the estimation. Column (3) shows that, despite the small number of observations, 
coefficients on macroeconomic policy variables are still significant and of the right sign. In 
particular, the coefficient on fiscal policy is significantly positive and of a similar magnitude 
as before. Also, unlike in columns (1) and (2), monetary policy now has a significantly 
negative coefficient, consistent with common expectations. Overall, Table 3 supports the 
view that expansionary policies, particularly expansionary fiscal policies, have been effective 
in promoting recovery from economic recession in Asia. 
I now estimate equation (4) and provide the results in Table 4. As before, columns (1) and 
(2) use GDP recessions from the OECD and developing Asia collectively, while column (3) 
considers only Asian recessions. Since equation (4) specifies the probability of recovery (or 
the hazard of exiting a recessionary state during which GDP remains below the previous 
peak), a variable with a positive coefficient should be interpreted as promoting recovery. 
Estimates reported in Table 4 denote coefficients rather than hazard ratios. Results in Table ADBI Working Paper 225    Hong 
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4 are broadly consistent with those in Table 3. First, in all specifications, the coefficient on 
fiscal policy is significantly positive while the coefficient on monetary policy is insignificantly 
different from zero. Second, the coefficient on the absolute value of amplitude is always 
significant and negative, indicating that the larger the initial drop is the longer it takes to 
recover. Note that this is not necessarily inconsistent with the positive coefficient on the 
same variable reported in Table 3. For a recession with a large peak-to-trough drop, it is 
entirely possible to have a high post-trough growth and yet not to recover to the previous 
peak quickly. Third, when significant, an expansionary policy in Japan promotes recovery in 
other countries. As columns (2) and (3) show, either a decrease in Japan’s interest rate or 
an increase in Japan’s government consumption is associated with a higher probability of 
recovering from a recession. 
Table 4: Probability of exiting a recession 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
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# of obs.  73  73  19 
 
Source: author’s calculations. 
Note: The probability density of recovery is assumed to follow a Weibull distribution. z-ratios are in parentheses. * and 
** denote significance at the 10% level and the 5% level, respectively. 
Tables 3 and 4 show that an expansionary macroeconomic policy can curb negative effects 
of a recession in the short run. The medium-term effect of the policy, however, is not known. 
Considering the time lag between a policy action and its influence on the economy, an 
expansionary action may continue to stimulate the economy several years later. On the 
other hand, an expansionary policy may entail an increase in fiscal burden or inflation, which 
in turn may increase the possibility of a recurring recession. In order to examine the medium-
term implications of an expansionary macroeconomic policy, I estimate the following probit 
equation that specifies the probability of a recurring recession as a function of short-term 
policy responses and control variables:  
probability of recurrencei = Ф(α0 + α1*fiscal policyi + α2*monetary policyi + α’Xi + ηi),  (5) 
where Ф is the cumulative normal distribution function and the subscript i denotes recession 
i. I define a recurring recession as a recession that takes place within five years of a trough. 
Using this definition, the probability of recurrence is 0.28 for the whole sample and 0 for 
Korea. I report the estimation results of equation (5) in Table 5. As before, columns (1) and 
(2) use the whole sample while column (3) uses only the Asian sample. One of the most 
robust results in Table 5 is the significantly positive coefficient on the monetary policy 
measure. This result indicates that a greater decrease in the interest rate made during the 
initial GDP downturn tends to lower the probability of another recession during the five years 
following the trough. Fiscal policy, on the other hand, is not particularly important in the 
medium term. As will be shown later, a fiscal expansion typically results in a persistent 
increase in fiscal debt. Table 5 suggests that, at least in the medium term, this negative side-
effect of a fiscal expansion does not have a direct influence on the economy. ADBI Working Paper 225    Hong 
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Another robust finding in Table 5 is the significantly negative coefficient on the absolute 
value of amplitude. This indicates that a downturn with a large amplitude (in absolute terms) 
is less likely to be followed by another downturn within the next five years. In other words, 
the economy may become more resilient to a negative shock after going through a severe 
recession. Policy variables of Japan are all insignificant and need no further comment. 
Table 5: Probability of a recurring recession 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
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# of obs.  73  73  19 
 
Source: author’s calculations. 
Note: Probit estimation of the probability of a recurring recession. The recurrence is defined as another recession that 
occurs within five years. z-ratios are in parentheses. * and ** denote significance at the 10% level and the 5% level, 
respectively. Monetary policy 1 is based on the cyclical adjustment of the interest rate that uses GDP gap, inflation, 
and dummy_85 as controlling variables. 
4.  EVALUATION OF KOREA’S FISCAL POLICY RESPONSE 
IN 2009 
In this section, I evaluate Korea’s fiscal policy response in 2009 in relation to the empirical 
analysis discussed above.  
4.1  How big was it? 
As in most other countries, Korea’s fiscal balance deteriorated substantially in 2009 as a 
consequence of economic slowdown and discretionary policy responses by the government. 
However, preliminary estimates indicate that Korea’s GDP growth rate in 2009 was not as 
bad as had been thought previously: it was slightly positive at 0.1%-0.2%.. While clearly 
lower than the country’s historical average, the growth figure is higher than most people had 
initially predicted. In fact, according to my definition, the Korean economy was not even in 
recession in 2009. Since fiscal balance is normally expected to change systematically with 
economic activity, one may wonder whether the sizeable government budget deficit in 2009 
can be justified by the GDP growth rate.  
In order to evaluate the magnitude of Korea’s fiscal response in 2009, I examine changes in 
the fiscal balance to GDP ratio after making cyclical adjustments to the series. In particular, I 
regress changes in the government budget  balance  to  GDP ratio on GDP growth and 
examine how the residual changed over time.
13
                                                 
13 Similar results are obtained when we first regress the fiscal balance to GDP ratio on logarithm of GDP 
(detrended using Hodrick-Prescott filtering) and then take differences of the residual. We have also examined 
residuals from regressing the fiscal balance/GDP ratio on GDP growth and found that the residual is lower in 
2009 than in 1998. 
 The correlation between the dependent 
variable (changes in the government budget balance to GDP ratio) and the independent 
variable (GDP growth) is about 0.53  in Korea for both the consolidated budget and the ADBI Working Paper 225    Hong 
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operational budget. Changes in the government budget balance to GDP ratio after cyclical 
adjustments are shown as a graph in Figure 6. As Figure 6 shows, the adjusted series is at 
its lowest in 2009, indicating that the sharp turn to government budget deficit in 2009 was 
more than can be warranted by the GDP growth rate. The expansionary change in 1998, in 
contrast, turns out to be fully justified by the low GDP growth rate at that time: the cyclically 
adjusted series is almost exactly zero for 1998. This suggests that Korea’s fiscal response in 
2009 was unprecedentedly large, especially when the severity of the economic downturn is 
taken into account. 
Figure 6: Korea’s Fiscal Response in 2009 
cyclically adjusted Δ(fiscal balance/GDP) 
 
Source: author’s calculation 
Korea’s fiscal response was large by international standards as well. When compared with 
other OECD economies in 2009, Korea appears to have been more keen to provide fiscal 
stimulus. The first graph in Figure 7 makes a comparison between OECD and Korea in 
terms of cyclically-adjusted changes in the government budget balance to GDP ratio, with 
the cyclical adjustment made in the same way as in Figure 6. To make an international 
comparison possible, fiscal balance here is defined as total outlays minus total tax and non-
tax receipts of the general government as reported in the  OECD Economic Outlook. 
Forecast values for 2010 and 2011 are from the same source. It is clear from the graph that 
the absolute magnitude of the fiscal response in 2009 was greater in Korea than in other 
OECD economies on average. A similar pattern is observed in the second graph in Figure 7 
where I adjust for country-fixed effects instead of cyclical components in the fiscal response 
series. After adjusting for country-fixed effects, fiscal measures in Korea in 2009 are shown 
to be more counter-cyclical than the same measures in other OECD economies. ADBI Working Paper 225    Hong 
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Figure 7: Fiscal Response in 2009: OECD vs. Korea 
cyclically adjusted Δ(fiscal balance/GDP) 
 
 
Source: author’s calculation 
 
 
fixed-effect controlled Δ(fiscal balance/GDP) 
 
 




The large magnitude of Korea’s fiscal response in 2009 can be associated with several 
reasons. First, as was clearly shown in the 1997-98 Asian crisis, concerns about exchange 
rate stability can substantially limit the scope for counter-cyclical monetary policy, especially 
in developing economies. With limited flexibility in monetary policy, fiscal policy should play a 
greater role in stabilizing the economy. Second, fiscal policy has relatively short outside lags. 
The long inside lag of fiscal policy can be reduced through the practice of supplementary 
budgets and front-loading of expenditures. These two  measures have been particularly 
useful in Korea. Since 1990, only in two years, 1993 and 2007, was a supplementary budget 
not  introduced.  In  1991, 1998, 1999, 2001, and 2003, two supplementary budgets were 
introduced in each year. Also, the rate of implementation of fiscal spending was as high as 
84% at the end of the third quarter of 2009. With such flexibility in its implementation and 
excution, a fiscal stimuls would naturally be favored by policy makers. Third, compared with 
other OECD economies, Korea has relatively small automatic stabilizers. This means that 
Korea needs to rely more on discretionary measures for stabilization. These explanations, 
however, do not provide an answer to the question of why fiscal the government budget 
deficit should be so large in 2009 compared with other years. 
Perhaps the most straightforward explanation may be that the Lee administration has a 
strong inclination for expansionary policies. From the beginning of his term in 2008, 
President Lee has been trying to implement various tax cut plans and large scale public 
projects. Apparently, the global financial crisis provided a rationale for his expansionary 
stance. 
4.2  How effective was it? 
Another important issue in the evaluation of a fiscal response is the magnitude of the fiscal 
multiplier. A multiplier greater than 1 means that a fiscal stimulus can be particularly effective 
in giving a boost to the economy. A multiplier less than 1 means that there is a “crowding-
out”  effect: an increase in government spending causes other  GDP  components to 
decrease. While studies have found a wide range of values for the short-term fiscal 
multiplier, it is typically less than 1. For example, Barro and Redlick (2009) found that the 
defense spending multiplier is 0.6-0.7, substantially smaller than 1. OECD Economic Outlook 
(2009) provides a summary of existing studies in addition to its own estimates of fiscal 
multipliers. According to the report, the spending multiplier is smaller than 1 for most OECD 
economies, including Korea with an estimate of 0.8. It is larger than 1 only for large 
economies such as the US, Japan, and Germany. Existing studies in Korea also inidicate 
that the fiscal multiplier is positive but less than 1. Hyun (2009), for example, estimates that 
a 1 unit increase in fiscal expenditure in Korea leads to a 0.4 unit increase in GDP in the 
same year and a 0.17 unit increase in the next year. Huh (2007) and Kim (2007) each use a 
structural vector autoregression model and find that the fiscal multiplier is not significantly 
different from zero or even negative. Moon (2010) reports larger estimates:  0.9 for the 
expenditure multiplier and 0.6 for the tax multiplier.  
It could be argued that the fiscal multiplier is likely to be larger in the current crisis because 
the effectiveness of a stimulus package depends on the severity of a recession. It is clear 
that the fiscal multiplier should be zero for an economy operating at full capacity. When there 
is slack in the economy, however, an increase in government demand would lead to an 
increase in output. At the same time, however, balance sheet effects and great uncertainty 
caused by a crisis can make individuals wanting to save more, thus lowering the fiscal 
multiplier. Thus, it is unclear what the net effect would be for the current crisis. 
In Table 3, I provided a result that is closely related to fiscal multipliers. According to Table 3, 
a 1 percentage point increase in government consumption growth during a recession period 
leads to a roughly 0.3 percentage point increase in GDP growth during the first year going 
into the recovery phase. While not directly comparable to previous estimates of multipliers, ADBI Working Paper 225    Hong 
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the result suggests that the short-term multiplier effect of government spending may be 
rather substantial.
14
It is not clear why my estimate of multiplier effects is so large. One possible explanation is 
that, in contrast to previous studies that examine all sample years, I  only use recession 
periods in my estimation. As mentioned above, a demand stimulus can be effective only 
when there are spare resources. My approach may produce a greater estimate of fiscal 
multiplier because resources are underutilized during recessions. Another possibility is that 
the composition of fiscal spending may be structurally different between recession or crisis 
periods and ordinary periods. For example, capital injection by the government into troubled 
financial institutions can promote recovery through money and credit creation rather than the 
traditional Keynesian multiplier effect. Government consumption expenditure during a crisis 
period may serve as a proxy for the overall fiscal stimulus package that includes capital 
injection and other similar measures.
 Since government consumption amounts to about 15% of GDP in my 
sample, a 1 percentage point increase in government consumption growth corresponds to 
additional government consumption of about 0.15% of GDP. The coefficient of 0.3 in Table 3 
thus implies that the short-term multiplier may be as high as 2 (=0.3/0.15). I also examine 
the medium-term effects of government spending, by extending the analysis in Table 3 and 
estimating the impact of fiscal policies on the growth rate in later years. I consider up to five 
years after the trough in my estimation and provide the results in Table 6. The result for the 
first post-trough year is the same as in column (1) in Table 3. Results for the other years 
suggest that effects of government spending may be even greater in the medium-term than 
in the short-term. 
15
Table 6: Fiscal Policy and Post-Trough Growth 
 
  1st year   2nd year   3rd year   4th year   5th year  



































# of obs.  73  73  72  72  72 
 
Source: author’s calculations 
Note: The dependent variable is the GDP growth rate during a year after the trough. Panel estimation with fixed 
effects. t-ratios are in parentheses. * and ** denote significance at the 10% level and the 5% level, respectively.
  
4.3  Debt sustainability 
While Korea’s fiscal response in 2009 may have contributed to an early recovery of the 
Korean economy, it has also raised concerns about fiscal consolidation. As described in 
Section II, Korea’s government debt to GDP ratio, although still relatively low by international 
standards, has been increasing very rapidly. In addition, it is widely believed that Korea has 
an unusually large number of “below-the-line” items that are not included in the official fiscal 
data. Some even argue that Korea’s too narrow coverage of fiscal debt makes international 
                                                 
14 Our measure of fiscal policy is accumulated changes in government consumption over the recession years, 
from the peak year to  the trough year. Since the duration of a recession can be longer than 1 year, the 
coefficient on fiscal policy in Table 3 may partly reflect lagged responses in GDP growth to a fiscal spending 
increase. 
15 As mentioned above, we use consumption expenditure, not total expenditure, of the government because of 
data availability. Government consumption expenditure does not include transfer payments. Transfer payments 
may have a smaller multiplier effect than government consumption expenditure, because recipients of transfer 
payments may not increase their spending by the same amount. ADBI Working Paper 225    Hong 
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comparison almost meaningless (Ok 2007). When the “below-the-line” items are included, 
Korea’s fiscal debt may be substantially greater. 
In this section, I assess the long-term sustainability of Korea’s fiscal debt by providing a 
review of existing empirical studies on the issue. Since one of the most distinguishing 
features of Korea’s government debt has been the rapidly increasing trend, most studies 
focus on the time series behavior, rather than the level, of fiscal variables. While these 
studies use various empirical methods including Bohn’s test, non-stationary tests, 
cointegration tests, etc., most of them conclude that Korea’s government debt position is 
sustainable. Bohn’s test examines how primary balance changes in response to the 
government  debt  to  GDP ratio in the previous period. If the  primary balance improves 
whenever the debt to GDP ratio increases, government debt is regarded as sustainable. By 
applying Bohn’s test to Korean data, Moon (2010) finds that a 1 percentage point increase in 
the debt to GDP ratio tends to be followed by a 0.1-0.15 percentage point increase in the 
primary balancce to GDP ratio. The esimated coefficient of 0.1-0.15 is not particularly small 
compared to estimates from other countries. Based on these results, Moon (2010) argues 
that Korea’s government debt passes the sustainability test. Some other studies examine 
whether the debt to GDP ratio is stationary or whether fiscal expenditure and revenue are 
cointegrated with each other. As long as the debt/GDP ratio does not diverge, one can 
assume  that fiscal debt is not increasing too fast. Similarly, as long as government 
expenditure does not deviate too much from fiscal revenue, it can be assumed that there is 
no persistent government budget deficit. Studies that follow these approaches typically find 
that Korea’s government debt is sustainable.  
Park et al. (2006) follow a somewhat different approach and focus on the level, rather than 
time series movements, of government debt. They first relate international differences in the 
levels of fiscal debt to various economic, demographic, and political variables. After adjusting 
for the effect of these factors on the magnitude of government debt, they find that Korea’s 
debt is smaller than predicted by the model. This result also supports the view that debt 
sustainability may not yet be a serious problem for Korea. Another way to determine the 
sustainable level of government debt is to compute the debt level that is consistent with the 
ability to generate a primary balance surplus and growth adjusted interest rates. According 
to simple intertemporal budget accounting, fiscal debt as a % of GDP should be less than 
p(1+g)/(r-g) where p is primary balance as a % of GDP, g the growth rate, and r the interest 
rate. For example, given r-g = 4% and p = 2%, the sustainable level of government debt 
should be less than 50% of GDP. However, it is not clear whether Korea’s government debt 
satisfies this criterion, because the calculation is quite sensitive to assumptions about the 
relevant interest rate. 
Although existing studies tend to conclude  that Korea’s fiscal debt is sustainable, the 
sizeable deficit and the rapidly increasing trend in the debt to GDP ratio in recent years still 
calls for vigilance. As is well known, the government budget  balance tends to move 
asymmetrically over a business cycle, with the deficit recorded during a recession not fully 
offset by the surplus during a boom. Consequently, an increase in government debt is rarely 
reversed. In Figure 8, I illustrate how government budget deficits translate into government 
debt over time using data from OECD. Figure 8 shows that, except for the years arount the 
Asian crisis, a 1 percentage point increase in the deficit to GDP ratio in a particular year was 
associated with a 4-5 percentage point increase in the debt  to  GDP ratio in 2007. 
Government budget deficits made during the Asian crisis period had an even greater impact 
on the government debt to GDP ratio in 2007. The lack of a trend in the series indicates that 
an increase in government deficit has an almost permanent effect on the level of government 




Figure 8: From Deficit to Debt: OECD 
 
Source: author’s calculation 
5.  POLICY FRAMEWORKS FOR FISCAL CONSOLIDATION  
In this section, I suggest  possible policy frameworks that may be used  for fiscal 
consolidation. As mentioned above, Korea’s government  debt increased quickly in the 
aftermath of the Asian crisis in 1998 and the global crisis in 2009. It is expected to further 
increase in the  coming years as a result of an aging population. Thus, it is crucial  to 
establish policy frameworks that can secure fiscal consolidation in the long run. 
First,  the Korean government may want to enforce that counter-cyclical discretionary 
measures shoud have no long-term implications for the government debt to GDP ratio. This 
is possible only when government budget deficits made during a recession are reversed 
during an economic boom. In order to achieve this, Korea will have to adopt a stricter 
practice of medium-term budget planning. Second, Korea may need to expand automatic 
stabilizers and reduce discretionary components in the government  budget. Under an 
administration with an expansionary bias, large discretionary components in the government 
budget may be particularly harmful for fiscal consolidation. Also, Korea has relatively small 
automatic stabilizers compared with other OECD economies. Automated changes in transfer 
payments, for example, would help expand Korea’s limited social safety net. Third, it may 
help to produce more comprehensive measures of government  debt by extending the 
coverage of offical debt figures. Fourth, further reforms in the national pension system will be 
needed, especially because Korea has one of the most rapidly ageing populations. Other 
standard policy responses to population ageing, such as promoting labor force participation 
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